CSCI-1680 DNS

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Based partly on lecture notes by Rodrigo Fonseca, Scott Shenker and John Jannotti

Administrivia

- <u>TCP milestone II</u>: sign up for a meeting this week (announcement soon)
- <u>TCP gearup III</u>: tentative, but probably this Thursday 5-7pm
- HW3: due tonight—<u>it's short</u>!

We're working through our grading backlog, should have progress soon


Connecting to a server: the story so far

POV: You want to connect to some website



<u>Connecting to a server: the story so far</u>

POV: You want to connect to some website



<u>Why not? Why is this bad?</u>	You	Some site 5.6.7.8
	connect(5.6.7.8, 80)	





- Need to know IP addresses!
 - Users won'tk now
 - <u>Hosts</u> don't know—can't remember every single one!
- Some host ?= its IP address? No!
 - A large website may be run by many servers
 - Devices may move between networks

<u>What we have so far</u>

<u>IP addresses</u>

- Used by routers to forward packets
- Fixed length, binary numbers
- Assigned based on <u>where host is</u> on the network
- Usually refers to <u>one host</u>

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<u>Examples</u>

- 5.6.7.8
- 212.58.224.138
- 2620:6e:6000:900:c1d:c9f7:8a1c:2f48

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
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
Efficient forwarding: Human readable: Scalable for distributed services:

=> Need a new abstraction for "stuff" we are trying to access

What we want: a new abstraction for <u>names</u>



What we want: a new abstraction for <u>names</u>



<u>What does this mean?</u>

cs.brown.edu => 128.148.32.110

Why?

- Names are easier to remember
- Addresses can change underneath
- Useful Multiplexing/sharing

cs.brown.edu => 128.148.32.110

<u>Why?</u>

- Names are easier to remember
- Addresses can change underneath
 - e.g, renumbering when changing providers
- Useful Multiplexing/sharing
 - One name -> multiple addresses
 - Multiple names -> one address

Another Change in Layers...

- Remember ARP
 - ARP: maps IP addresses to MAC addresses

The original way: one file: hosts.txt

- Flat namespace
- Central administrator kept master copy (for the Internet)
- To add a host, emailed admin
- Downloaded file regularly

320 **********************************					
	NET HOST NAMES AND		10-Jun-82		
HOST NAME	HOST ADDRESS	SPONSOR	LIAISON		
ACC	10.2.0.54 VD	H ARPA	Lockwood, Gregory (LOCKWOODABBNC) Associated Computer Consultants 414 East Cota Street Santa Barbara, California 93101 (805) 965-1023		
	PDP-11/70(UNIX) 10.2.0.35	ARPA	McBride, William T. (MCBRIDE&USC-ISIC) Naval Ocean Systems Center Code 8321 271 Catalina Boulevard San Diego, California 92152 (714) 225-2083 (AV) 933-2083		
AEROSPACE	10.2.0.65	AFSC	Nelson, Louis C. (LOU@AEROSPACE) Aerospace Corporation A2/1013 P.O. Box 92957 Los Angeles, California 90009 (213) 615-4424		
AFGL	VAX-11/780(UNIX) 10.1.0.66	AFSC	Cosentino. Antonio		
н на 4 4			(COSENTINOMAFSC-HQ) Air Force Geophysics Laboratory SUNA Mail Stop 30 Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts 01731 (617) 861-4161 (AV) 478-4161		
	PDP-11/50(RSX11M)				
		AFSC	Cosentino, Antonio (COSENTINO@AFSC-HQ) Air Force Geophysics Laboratory SUNA Mail Stop 30 Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts 01731 (617) 861-4161 (AV) 478-4161		
CPUtype:	C/30				

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Does it scale?

Lol no.

Scalable (Address <-> Name) Mappings

Original way: one file: hosts.txt

- Flat namespace
- Central administrator kept master copy (for the Internet)
- To add a host, emailed admin
- Downloaded file regularly

Is this feasible today? Lol no.

Domain Name System (DNS)

- Originally proposed by RFC882, RFC883 (1983)
- Distributed protocol to translate hostnames -> IP addresses
 - Human-readable names
 - Delegated control
 - Load-balancing/content delivery
 - So much more...

=> Distributed key-value store, before it was cool...



• Scalability

• Distributed Control

• Fault Tolerance

Goals for DNS

- Scalability
 - Must handle a huge number of records
 - With some software synthesizing names on the fly
 - Must sustain update and lookup load

- Distributed Control
 - Let people control their own names
- Fault Tolerance
 - Minimize lookup failures in face of other network problems

The good news

Compared to other distributed systems, some properties that make these goals easier to achieve...

1. Read-mostly database

Lookups MUCH more frequent than updates

2. Loose consistency

When adding a machine, not end of the world if it takes minutes or hours to propagate

Can use lots and lots of caching

- Once you've lookup up a hostname, remember
- Don't have to look again in the near future

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
How it works

Hierarchical namespace broken into zones

cslab1a.cs.brown.edu

How it works

- Hierarchical namespace broken into zones
 - root (.), edu., brown.edu., cs.brown.edu.,
 - Zones separately administered => delegation
 - Parent zone tells you how to find servers for subdomains
- Each zone served from multiple replicated servers
- Lots and lots of caching



Types of DNS servers


"Types" of DNS servers

- Top Level Domain (TLD) servers
 - Generic domains (e.g., com, org, edu)
 - Country domains (e.g., uk, br, tv, in, ly)
 - Special domains (e.g., arpa)
 - Corporate domains (...)
- Authoritative DNS servers
 - Provides public records for hosts at an organization
 - Can be maintained locally or by a service provider
- Recursive resolvers
 - Big public servers, or local to a network
 - Lots of caching



Resolver operation

- Apps make recursive queries to local DNS server (1)
 - Ask server to get answer for you
- Server makes iterative queries to remote servers (2,4,6)
 - Ask servers who to ask next
 - Cache results aggressively



Where is the root server?

- Located in New York
- How do we make the root scale?

Verisign, New York, NY




DNS Root Servers


- 13 Root Servers (www.root-servers.org)
 - Labeled A through M (e.g, A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET)
- Does this scale?



DNS Root Servers

- 13 Root Servers (www.root-servers.org)
 - Labeled A through M (e.g, A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET)
- Remember anycast?





DNS Root Servers: Today



From: www.root-servers.org

DNS Caching

- Recursive queries are expensive
- Caching greatly reduces overhead
 - Top level servers very rarely change
 - Popular sites visited often
 - Local DNS server caches information from many users
- How long do you store a cached response?
 - Original server tells you: TTL entry
 - Server deletes entry after TTL expires

Reverse DNS

How do we get the other direction, IP address to name?

- Addresses have a natural hierarchy:
 - 128.148.32.12
- Idea: reverse the numbers: 12.32.148.128 ...
 - and look that up in DNS
- Under what TLD?
 - Convention: in-addr.arpa
 - Lookup 12.32.148.128.in-addr.arpa
 - in6.arpa for IPv6

DNS Protocol

- TCP/UDP port 53
- Most traffic uses UDP
 - Lightweight protocol has 512 byte message limit
 - Retry using TCP if UDP fails (e.g., reply truncated)
- Bit in query determines if query is recursive

DNS Example

```
$ dig cs.brown.edu @10.1.1.10
; <<>> DiG 9.10.6 <<>> cs.brown.edu @10.1.1.10
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 8536
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1220
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;cs.brown.edu. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
cs.brown.edu.
                       1800
                                 IN A 128.148.32.12
;; Query time: 69 msec
;; SERVER: 10.1.1.10#53(10.1.1.10)
;; WHEN: Tue Apr 19 09:03:39 EDT 2022
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 57
```

% dig +norec cs.brown.edu @j.root-servers.net

When server doesn't know all info...

; <<>> DiG 9.10.6 <<>> +norec cs.brown.edu @j.root-servers.net
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 61618</pre>

;; flags: qr; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 13, ADDITIONAL: 27

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1232 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;cs.brown.edu. IN A

;; AUTHORITY SECTION: edu. 172800 IN NS a.edu-servers.net. edu. 172800 IN NS b.edu-servers.net. edu. 172800 IN NS l.edu-servers.net. edu. 172800 IN NS m.edu-servers.net.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: a.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.5.6.30 b.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.33.14.30 c.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.26.92.30 d.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.31.80.30 e.edu-servers.net. 172800 IN A 192.12.94.30



dig . ns

dig +norec www.cs.brown.edu @a.root-servers.net

dig +norec www.cs.brown.edu @a.edu-servers.net

dig +norec www.cs.brown.edu @bru-ns1.brown.edu

www.cs.brown.edu. 86400 IN A 128.148.32.110

Resource Records

All DNS info represented as resource records (RR) name [ttl] [class] type rdata

- name: domain name
- TTL: time to live in seconds
- class: for extensibility, normally IN (1) "Internet"
- type: type of the record
- rdata: resource data dependent on the type

• Example RRs

www.cs.brown.edu.	86400	IN	А	128.148.32.110
cs.brown.edu.	86400	IN	NS	dns.cs.brown.edu.
cs.brown.edu.	86400	IN	NS	ns1.ucsb.edu.

DNS record types

RR Type	Purpose	Example
А	IPv4 Address	128.148.56.2
AAAA	IPv6 Address	2001:470:8956:20::1
CNAME	Specifies an alias ("Canonical name")	systems.cs.brown.edu. 86400 IN CNAME systems-v3.cs.brown.edu. systems-v3.cs.brown.edu. 86400 IN A 128.148.36.51
MX	Mail servers	MX <priority> <ip>eg. MX 10 1.2.3.4</ip></priority>
SOA	Start of authority	Information about who owns a zone
PTR	Reverse IP lookup	7.34.148.128.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN PTR quanto.cs.brown.edu.
SRV	How to reach specific services (eg. host, port)	_minecrafttcp.example.net 3600 SRV <priority> <weight> <port> <server ip=""></server></port></weight></priority>

More: <u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_DNS_record_types</u>

Inserting a Record in DNS

Your new startup helpme.com

Some important details

- How do local servers find root servers?
 - DNS lookup on a.root-servers.net ?
 - Servers configured with root cache file
 - Contains root name servers and their addresses

. 3600000 IN NS A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. 3600000 A 198.41.0.4 ...

- How do you get addresses of other name servers?
 - To obtain the address of www.cs.brown.edu, ask a.edu-servers.net, says a.rootservers.net
 - How do you find a.edu-servers.net?
 - Glue records: A records in parent zone

Other uses of DNS

- Local multicast DNS
 - Used for service discovery
 - Made popular by Apple
 - This is how you learn of different Apple TVs in the building
- Load balancing
- CDNs (more on this later)

Reliability

- Answers may contain several alternate servers
- Try alternate servers on timeout
 - Exponential backoff when retrying same server
- Use same identifier for all queries
 - Don't care which server responds, take first answer

Inserting a Record in DNS

- Your new startup helpme.com
- Get a block of addresses from ISP
 - Say 212.44.9.0/24
- Register helpme.com at namecheap.com (for ex.)
 - Provide name and address of your authoritative name server (primary and secondary)
 - Registrar inserts RR pair into the .com TLD server:
 - helpme.com NS dns1.helpme.com
 - dns1.helpme.com A 212.44.9.120
- Configure your authoritative server (dns1.helpme.com)
 - Type A record for www.helpme.com
 - Type MX record for helpme.com

Inserting a Record in DNS, cont

- Need to provide reverse PTR bindings
 - E.g., 212.44.9.120 -> dns1.helpme.com
- Configure your dns server to serve the 9.44.212.in-addr.arpa zone
 Need to add a record of this NS into the parent zone (44.212.in-addr.arpa)
- Insert the bindings into the 9.44.212.in-addr.arpa zone

DNS Security

- You go to starbucks, how does your browser find www.google.com?
 - Ask local name server, obtained from DHCP

	optioni (15) Domain Name	
\sim	Option: (6) Domain Name Server	
	Length: 12	
	Domain Name Server: 1.1.1.1	
	Domain Name Server: 4.2.2.1	
	Domain Name Server: 8.8.8.8	

• Can you trust this DNS server?

Great Firewall of CIT

If attacker is on the path (say, it is the ISP, or a malicious version of TStaff), what could they do?

- Can sniff all DNS queries
- Send fake responses back first
- Could do this selectively, to direct facebook.com to cs.brown.edu, for example...

Great Firewall of CIT

If attacker is on the path (say, it is the ISP, or a malicious version of TStaff), what could they do?



https://blog.thousandeyes.com/monitoring-dns-in-china/

Public DNS

Public DNS resolvers provided by cloud companies and ISPs

- 8.8.8.8 (Google)
- 1.1.1.1 (Cloudflare)
- ... and others

Why do this?



"Helpful" ISPs

- Many ISPs hijack NXDOMAIN responses to "help" by offering search and advertisement related to the domain
- E.g., <u>www.bicycleisntadomain.com</u> doesn't (currently) exist
 - Could return a page with search and ads on bicycles (or domain registrations?)

What can be done?

Some defenses against DNS spoofing/hijacking

What can be done?


Some defenses against DNS spoofing/hijacking

- DNSSEC: protocol to sign/verify hierarchy of DNS lookups
 - Expensive to deploy, hierarchy must support at all levels
 - APNIC DNSSEC monitor: <u>https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec</u>
 - <u>https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/deploy360/2012/nist-ipv6-and-dnssec-statistics-6/</u>
- Tunneling DNS: client uses DNS via more secure protocol
 DNS over HTTPS
 - DNS over TLS

More on DNS

Structure of a DNS Message

- Same format for queries and replies
 - Query has 0 RRs in Answer/Authority/Additional
 - Reply includes question, plus has RRs
- Authority allows for delegation
- Additional for glue, other RRs client might need



Header format

- Id: match response to query; QR: 0 query/1 response
- RCODE: error code.
- AA: authoritative answer, TC: truncated,
- RD: recursion desired, RA: recursion avai

0	1	2	3	4	5			_		0	1	2	1 3	4	1 5
+++++++++++++															
++ QR						TC	RD	RA		Z	I		RCC		
+++++++++++++															
+++++++++++++															
+++++++++++++															
++						1	ARCO	DUNT	•						I.

Other RR Types

- CNAME (canonical name): specifies an alias
- www.google.com.446199 INCNAMEwww.l.google.com.www.l.google.com.300INA72.14.204.147
- MX record: specifies servers to handle mail for a domain (the part after the @ in email addr)
 - Different for historical reasons
- SOA (start of authority)
 - Information about a DNS zone and the server responsible for the zone
- PTR (reverse lookup)
 - 7.34.148.128.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN PTR quanto.cs.brown.edu.